WHEN IS MAN A ‘STATE SUBJECT’ AND A WOMAN NOT?
Kulwant SinghThe changing rights of women in Jammu and Kashmir in the era of globalization



The notion of ‘state subject’ was created in an attempt to pacify the large numbers of unemployed following colonial rule from 1889 to 1921. In 1927 many western educated men still held key positions within state administration so Maharaja Hari Singh, the fourth Dogra ruler, attempted to soothe the ruffled feelings of his subjects by reasserting the rights of his subjects over outsiders.
State legislation seems to be designed to keep non-residents out, and therefore the transient nature of a woman’s domicile can be used against her. This can be seen in the Jammu and Kashmir case of Prakash versus Shahni. In the court’s view, Ms Shahni could not be treated as a ‘permanent resident’ of the State because although she moved into the state in 1947, she had not acquired any property at that time. Under the definition of permanent resident the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir includes those who having lawfully acquired immovable property in the state have been ordinarily resident therein for not less than ten years prior to 14 May 1954. Although Ms Shahni argued that she should be allowed to claim the residency status of her father, this was disallowed on the basis that she was married to an outsider and would therefore assume the status of her spouse as opposed to that of her father.
This view was shared by J Jan Muzaffar, who delivered the dissenting opinion in the Susheela Sawhney case. To support his argument he cited the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir high court in Prakash versus Shahni, wherein the court used the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, which states that a married woman acquires the domicile of her husband if she did not have the same before marriage. But the court in Susheela Sawhney concluded that loss of residency status should not apply to a woman who is already a ‘permanent resident’ of the state before marriage.
In most countries the domicile of a married woman is ascertained in the same way as the domicile of an independent person. Moreover, the status of permanent resident is quite independent of domicile.

Indeed there appears to be no legal flexibility when interpreting a woman’s domicile in Jammu and Kashmir. It is difficult to imagine such discriminatory practice against women in today’s age but such inequality is being sanctioned through the use of international private law which states ‘the domicile of the wife faithfully follows the domicile of her husband.’ This is a system of law which many now consider defunct, and yet state ‘protectors’ claim forms the basis of the 1927 notification. Its use in the state has been hailed in the courtrooms as ‘the most barbarous relic of the wife’s servitude’ and yet this law is still robust enough to allow the state to create inequality on the grounds of gender alone and despite the fact that such practice contravenes several international laws as well as the state constitution and the constitution of India.
There have been many other occasions when the state’s legal definition of domicile has been used to deny women permanent residency. The selection of a female doctor at the Jammu government medical college was quashed by a high court judge on the grounds that she was married to a non-state subject. In another legal battle a petitioner challenged the state law which issues Kashmiri women with permanent residency certificates valid only ‘until marriage.’ She asserted that the clause violated her fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India and was discriminatory on the basis of sex. Then there was the case of a Kashmiri woman’s admission to a postgraduate course in a government medical college. This was made conditional on the production of a ‘permanent resident certificate’ by a stipulated date, after her marriage to a non-state resident. Comprehending that she would not be issued with the certificate, she filed a writ petition to quash the demand. This was on the grounds that she continued to be a permanent resident of Jammu and Kashmir even though she had married a non-state subject.
Because all the above cases and others were challenged, the Jammu and Kashmir high court was called upon to examine the issue of a woman’s residency and therefore also her right to hold, inherit and acquire immovable property in the state following marriage to a non-resident. In a landmark decision the high court found in favour of the women.


But supporters of the Disqualification Bill passionately plead that such a legislative measure is necessary to prevent erosion of the special status that Jammu and Kashmir holds, and which is guaranteed to them by article 370 of the constitution of India. They add that the practice of depriving a female of her status upon marriage to a non-resident is now a long-held practice, observed for more than seventy seven years, and that on these grounds should now be accepted practice. Yet it is difficult to accept such the rightness of a practice so patently contrary to the principles of natural justice, and which is considered so wrong by those affected by it, merely because of its longevity.
Should the legislative power the state holds to modify the special rights or privileges of permanent residents be absolute or unbridled? No such power can be unlimited in a civilized society, and yet supporters of the bill argue that the state has the right to introduce a bill defining or altering the definition of persons treated as ‘permanent residents’ of the state, as well as conferring upon or changing special rights or privileges to such residents. Supporters further their claim to legitimacy by pointing out that the Indian constitution also provides immunity from constitutional challenge for laws concerning the rights of permanent residents. It states that a law conferring special rights and privileges on state residents shall not be held void merely because it takes away the rights conferred on Indian citizens who are not ‘permanent residents’ of the state. This provision, however, cannot be taken to mean that the state legislature is allowed to discriminate between existing permanent residents. Moreover, those who take shelter under international law cannot ignore the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women prohibiting the automatic change of nationality of the wife upon marriage.
In the matter of inheritance, the personal laws have been allowed to have their full sway. They do not deprive a daughter of inheriting the property of her parents as a legal heir, as long as the devolution of property does not depend upon the status of a person. Instead the rule of inheritance is Islamic law in cases where the parties are Muslims and Hindu law in cases where the parties are Hindus. The only restrictions applied are again those linked to residency: any state property inherited cannot be sold to anyone other than a permanent resident of the state.

